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NOTE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-THE

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
AND EQUITABLE DISCRETION

5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)
INTRODUCTION

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)l provides for judicial review of an agency's refusal to produce information. Section
552(a)(3) 2 of that Act grants federal district courts jurisdiction to
order agencies to disclose improperly withheld records. The FOIA
was intended by Congress to give any person access to governmental records, unless the material sought falls within one of nine
expressly enumerated exemptions.' In general, the Act places the
burden on the agency to justify nondisclosure. 4
This Act replaced section 3 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), ' which had granted administrative agencies discretion in determining whether to release information, with little or
no opportunity for judicial review of the agency's action. Under
'5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
"The pertinent text of the statute is set forth in section I, infra.
:'Exempted are:
(b) IMlatters that are ....
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to
the extent available by law to a party other than an agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for
the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps,
concerning wells.
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970). See also Annot., 7 A.L.R. FED. 870 (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
'Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237.
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the prior provisions, if agency officials determined that the information sought could be withheld for any of a number of reasons,'
the party seeking the information had no remedy available unless
an action was pending before a court so that pretrial discovery
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would be available.'
Both the House and Senate condemned the results under the
prior Act, which through its broad language generally allowed the
withholding of information." The changes made by the FOIA were
fundamental, creating a true disclosure act and eliminating the
vague standards embodied in the APA.
The emphasis in the FOIA on required disclosure, however,
has led to the further question of whether courts should exercise
equitable discretion in applying the Act, beyond determining if
any of the nine specified exemptions apply. An increasing divergence of viewpoint within and between jurisdictions that have
considered this issue has become apparent since the exercise of
such discretion was first upheld in Consumers Union, Inc. v. Veterans Administration.' One view is that the Act allows courts to
exercise equitable discretion; the opposite is that in applying the
Act, courts should limit themselves to ascertaining whether any
specific exemption applies, and, if not, disclosure should be ordered. The recent case of Hawkes v. IRS'" typifies the ongoing
debate regarding equitable discretion under the Act. Hawkes also
provides a vantage point for possible reconciliation of the conflict
that has emerged from this debate.
To understand these recent developments and their implications, this note will analyze the Act's language and its legislative
history to determine whether Congress intended that Act to abro'The prior Act allowed agencies to withhold records for such reasons as secrecy required "in the public interest;" the agency officials determined that the records sought
related to the internal management of the agency; or there was "good cause found" to
withhold
the records. Id.; Annot., supra note 3, at 884.
7
Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237; Annot., supra note 3, at 884-85.
'H.R.REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966); S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 5 (1965); see Annot., supra note 3, at 879; Note, JudicialDiscretionand the Freedom
of Information Act: DisclosureDenied: Consumers Union v. Veterans Administration, 45
IND. L.J. 421 (1970); Note, Administrative Law-The Freedom of Information Act-The
Use of Equitable Discretion to Modify the Act, 44 TUL. L. REV. 800 (1970).
'301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
For discussions of this issue in light of Consumers Union, see Note, Judicial Discretion
and the Freedom of Information Act: Disclosure Denied: Consumers Union v. Veterans
Administration, supra note 8, at 424; Note, Administrative Law-The Freedom of Information Act-The Use of Equitable Discretion to Modify the Act, supra note 8, at 805.
"467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
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gate courts' equitable remedies, discuss the Consumers Union
and Hawkes cases concerning the use of traditional equitable
principles to withhold disclosure which would otherwise be available under the Act, and propose reconciliation through coexistence of the two seemingly conflicting viewpoints enumerated
above.
I. FOIA: ITS LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The language of the FOIA appears to convey a clear Congressional intent to make the Act the exclusive authority for withholding information. The pertinent sections of the Act provide:
(3) [Elach agency, on request for identifiable records made in accordance with published rules . . . shall make the records promptly

available to any person. On complaint, the district court of the
United States in the district in which the complainant resides, ...
has jurisdiction to enjoin the agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any agency records improperly
withheld from the complainant. In such a case the court shall determine the matter de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain
its action. In the event of noncompliance with the order of the court,
the district court may punish for contempt the responsible employee

(c) This section does not authorize withholding of information
or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in this section. This section is not authority to withhold
information from Congress."

In spite of this strong language, it is not clear from the legislative history of the Act that Congress intended to exclude judicial use of equitable discretion in the application of the FOIA.
The intention of the Senate in enacting the FOIA was to close the
loopholes of section 3 of the APA, which it superseded, thereby
creating a disclosure act to replace what had become a withholding act. 2 The FOIA was to make available "to any person" all
information disclosable under its terms, and to allow exemptions
based only on the nature of the material sought, not on the identity or status of the seeker." However, the authority of the Senate's interpretation of the Act, approved by the House and Senate
when the Act was passed, is weakened through contradiction by
the interpretation given the Act by the House Committee on
"5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (c) (1970) (emphasis added).
'2S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
'3ld.
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Government Operations, which reported favorably without
amendment on the Senate bill to amend section 3 of the APA.
The House interpretation of the language in subsection 552(a)(3)
was that the proceedings were to be de novo "so that the court
can consider the propriety of the withholding instead of being
restricted to judicial sanctioning of agency discretion."'" The
grant of authority to the district courts was, in the view of the
House, to enjoin an agency from withholding information "whenever [the court] considers such action equitable and appropriate."' Thus, either viewpoint of the Act-that it does or does not
allow equitable discretion in its application by the courts-gives
effect to what was arguably the legislative intent, based on both
the language and the legislative history of the Act.
It has been suggested that an amendment is necessary to
clarify Congressional intent with respect to equitable discretion.
During the 1972 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations, one witness stated:
Those of us who participated, in the 1960's, in the drafting and
passage of the act never dreamed that our glaring imperfections
would be reviewed and, hopefully, corrected at such an early stage.
We knew that we had achieved only a small beginning, and that we
had compromised away much for the sake of passage of the act.
The major deficiencies in the act as codified, in my view, are
contained in section 552(a)(3) and (4).
. . . [T]he
to any person"
into a person's
of the Freedom
any particular
cords, nor that

phrase "shall make the records promptly available
is still causing troubles. Judges continue to inquire
"need to know." It was not the intent of the drafters
of Information Act that a person should have to have
or stated reason for wishing to see Government remotivation should be a matter for the courts.
. . . [Jludges have decided for themselves that it is discretion-

"1H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th CONG., 2d Sess. 9 (1966).
'l1d.
'"The witness was Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., an attorney, described as one of the
"experienced frontline soldiers in the fight for the public's 'right to know' [who has]
brought and is presently engaged in litigation which has substantially opened the doors
on our Government's activities," by Representative William S. Moorhead, Chairman of
the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee of the Committee on
Government Operations. Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act Before a Sub-

comm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, at
1375-76 (1972).
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ary with them whether they order the production of nonexempt
material. In effect, they are applying theories of equity. This, again,
was not the intention of the drafters. Hence the phrase "has jurisdiction to enjoin" should be changed to read "shall enjoin."' 7

This proposed change, however, would be unlikely to effectuate clearly the intent of Congress to remove equitable discretion
from courts, as there is precedent that even the words "shall
enjoin" are not necessarily sufficient to preclude courts from exercising their inherent equity powers." In commenting on the Supreme Court's position in Hecht Co. v. Bowles," Professor Davis
stated:
Even though the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 provided
that an injunction "shall be granted" against a violation, the Supreme Court held "we do not think that under all circumstances the
court must issue the injunction or other order which the Administrator seeks." The Court emphasized the fundamental character of
equity jurisdiction: "The qualities of mercy and practicality have
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation
between the public interest and private needs as well as between
competing private claims." The Court accordingly upheld a refusal
to enjoin violations resting on "mistakes . . . made in good faith
When the Supreme Court so holds even under a statutory provision that an injunction "shall be granted," surely equitable traditions apply under the Information Act's provision that the court
"shall have jurisdiction ....
"'"

The Supreme Court recognizes its jurisdiction to exercise
equitable discretion in appropriate cases, and by analogy to the
Hecht case, the Supreme Court would not restrict courts to application of the Act's exemptions where the equities involved called
for additional considerations. If Congress is to limit the equity
powers of a court, then, it must do so expressly, and the words
"shall enjoin" are probably not sufficient to convey decisively
that under all circumstances Congress intends that courts apply
only statutory rules, and not equitable principles.'
7Id. at 1377-78.
"Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944).
"Id.

"'Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminarv Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 767
(1967). But see United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39 (1959), wherein the
Supreme Court held that the court must issue an injunction when the statutory requirements of the Labor-Management Relations Act were met.
"'It should be noted, however, that the fact that Congress would change the FOIA to
say "shall enjoin," after extensive hearings showing that this would deprive courts of
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II. FOIA CASES AND THE USE OF EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES
A. Consumers Union, Inc. v. Veterans Administration
If words as strong as "shall enjoin" are insufficient under
present rules of statutory construction to remove equitable discretion from the courts, it is hardly surprising that, under the current wording of the Act, numerous cases exist upholding equitable discretion to refuse enforcement in FOIA cases even when the
material sought does not come within a specific exemption.22 In
the first case upholding such discretion, Consumers Union, Inc.
2 " Consumers
v. Veterans Administration,
Union sought release of
Veterans Administration (VA) test results and evaluations that
had served as the basis of a qualified products list from which VA
doctors prescribed hearing aids. The court concluded that although none of the exemptions from disclosure in subsection
552(b) applied, it was not automatically bound under the Act to
order disclosure. The Consumers Union court held that, if records
are not exempted from disclosure under that Act, the court must
order disclosure unless the agency proves that greater harm than
good would result; moreover, the court emphasized that it is the
effect on the public rather than on the person seeking information
2
that must be weighed. 1
equity jurisdiction, might in itself make a stronger case for courts to abstain from exercising their discretion. Generally, however, where principles and rules of equity are extended
or abridged by statute, the statute is given a strict construction, i.e., courts will normally
construe the statute so as to preserve their equitable powers. Dennis v. Prather, 212 Ala.
449, 103 So. 59 (1925); Ethridge v. Pitts, 152 Ga. 1, 108 S.E. 543 (1921); Jay-Bee Realty
Corp. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 330 I1. App. 310, 50 N.E.2d 973 (1943); Brown v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry., 82 N.W. 1003 (Iowa 1900). It has also been said that a court of equity may
not be divested of its jurisdiction by implication. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry,
Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291-92 (1960). When Congress extends to an equity court power to
enforce statutory enactments, "it must be taken to have acted cognizant of the historic
power of equity to provide complete relief in the light of statutory purposes." Id. at 292.
"Cases holding or implying that courts do have equitable discretion to decide whether
to order disclosure of documents not exempt from the Act include Wu v. National Endowment for Humanities, 460 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1972); General Servs. Admin. v. Benson,
415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Consumers
Union v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot,
436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971). Cases with implications that such discretion does not exist
include Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d
787, 792 n.6 (6th Cir. 1972); Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 661-62
(6th Cir. 1972); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Soucie v. David, 448
F.2d 1067, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (dictum); Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir.
1971); Stokes v. Hodgson, 347 F. Supp. 1371, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1972).
1:1301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
"Id. See Annot., supra note 3, at 891; Wiel, Administrative Finality, 38 HARV. L. REV.
447, 462 (1925) (discussion of effects of administrative action on the public); Davis, supra
note 20.
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The Consumers Union court expressly adopted the general
rule that statutes are not to be construed so as to divest by implication a court of equity of its jurisdiction.", The court looked to
the language of subsection 552(a)(3) granting district courts "jurisdiction to enjoin,"" which sounds in equity, as a basis for its
reasoning that courts can and should apply their full equity powers in FOIA cases.
The mandate in subsection 552(a)(3) that "the court shall
determine the matter de novo"27 has also been used as a basis for
arguing that the general scope of judicial review in considering an
order to disclose particular records should not be limited merely
to determining the technical applicability of the nine exemptions.
The injunction is an equitable remedy. In a trial de novo under
subsection (c) the district court is free to exercise the traditional
discretion of a court of equity in determining whether or not the
relief sought by the plaintiff should be granted."

Under this argument, subsection 552(a)(3) is interpreted as implicitly providing for the use of equitable discretion, and therefore
the restriction of subsection 552(c) does not prevent courts from
exercising such discretion.
B. Hawkes v. IRS
Equally forceful arguments have been made by courts refusing to apply equitable discretion when none of the FOIA exemptions authorize withholding information. The majority opinion in
Hawkes v. IRS2"' typifies the latter approach. In Hawkes, the
plaintiff had been indicted for tax fraud, and to prepare his defense sought information and documents held by the IRS, some
through regular discovery proceedings and some extrajudicially.
The IRS declined to release some of the requested information,
including portions of an IRS manual which had not been requested through the discovery proceedings. Hawkes then sought
in a separate action under the FOIA an order requiring disclosure
of all requested materials. The IRS successfully moved for dis".See the discussion of general principles concerning statutory enactments and equity
discretion, supra note 21.
2'5
U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
2

Id.

GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE APA
27. 29 (1967). Subsection (c) provides that the Act does not authorize withholding inforination except as specifically provided. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970); see text accompanying
note 11 supra.
2'467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
2'ATToRNEY
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missal, arguing that disclosure under the FOIA was an equitable
remedy which should not be granted when there was an adequate
remedy at law available, here discovery proceedings. The IRS
also argued that the material sought was specifically exempted
from the FOIA under subsection 552(b)(2).10 The district court
ruled in favor of the IRS, and, while his civil appeal was pending,
Hawkes entered a plea of nolo contendere to the fraud case and
was sentenced to prison.'
Although the Sixth Circuit was able to dispose of Hawkes'
civil appeal on an unrelated issue,32 the court felt the matter of
equitable discretion was of sufficient importance to merit comment, even though the court specifically declined to set a binding
precedent pending a "live controversy." 33
The majority in Hawkes looked to the intent of the legislature as their basis for rejecting the IRS' argument that a district
court, in applying the FOIA, is bound by rules traditionally governing equity courts, and in particular the principle that equitable relief is not to be granted where an adequate remedy at law
exists. The Hawkes majority reasoned that not only may Congress cut back on both discretionary power and on restrictions of
equity jurisdiction when it grants courts injunctive power to enforce federal policy, but that Congress actually intended to do so
under the Act. Therefore, they reasoned, Congress did not intend
to require exhaustion of the criminal discovery process as a prerequisite to disclosure under the FOIA. The court held that in accordance with Congressional intent the FOIA denies the court
power to refuse disclosure of materials covered by the Act for any
34
reason other than those exceptions listed in subsection 552(b).
The majority pointed out that protection for documents to be
disclosed only through the discovery process is afforded ly
subsections 552(b)(7) and (b)(3) of the Act, and that whatever
conflicts might arise between criminal discovery procedure and
civil disclosure suit under the Act would be minimal in nature
and could be handled by the judicial process.35
U5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970).
:'467 F.2d at 790 n.3.
3
The lower court had failed to consider the propriety of withholding all the requested
information. Its ruling, and the IRS' arguments for dismissal, focused solely upon the IRS
manual. Id. at 790-91.
:Id.at 792-93 n.6.
3
This is also the position of the Ninth and District of Columbia Circuits. Note,
Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1972, 1973 DUKE L.J. 178 n.9.
: 467 F.2d at 792-93 n.6.
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The court viewed the legislative history of section 3 of the
APA and of the Information Act as expressing an intent to allow
exemptions based "on the nature of the material sought-not the
identity or status of the seeker. '" ' Therefore application of the
principle that equitable relief would not be granted where an
adequate remedy at law exists would thwart the Act's purpose
since it would require a court to look at the seeker's situation and
reasons for requesting the information in order to determine if he
might obtain the requested information through any other legal
means prior to allowing him to invoke the injunctive remedy
provided by the Act. In sum, the majority in Hawkes found that
in giving effect to Congressional intent the court, under the Act,
does not possess its full equitable powers.
C.

Judge Miller's Separate Opinion in Hawkes
Judge Miller in his separate opinion, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, did not agree that the power of a court sitting
in equity is necessarily restricted by the FOIA, and especially
objected to the majority's discussion of the equitable discretion
question prior to its presentation in a live controversy. 3 He stated
that "a strong argument can be made that courts do possess
equitable powers under the Act." ' It was his opinion that it was
unnecessary to decide whether a court may apply equitable principles under the Act, but since the majority saw fit to speak out
on the issue he resisted their contention that the FOIA generally
restricts discretionary jurisdiction and the powers of a court sitting in equity.
The majority and Judge Miller start from contrary premises:
The majority, that application of the FOIA is governed by the
legislative intent which precludes a court from exercising its traditional equitable jurisdiction; Judge Miller, that the court retains equity powers when applying the Act, since neither its language nor its history expressly provides otherwise.
II.

RESOLUTION

By juxtaposing and analyzing the seemingly conflicting viewpoints of the Consumers Union court and the Hawkes court, a
basis for resolution can be found. An analysis of Judge Miller's
"'Id.See also id. at 790 n.3.
'1d. at 797.
:'Id. Judge Miller was quoting his concurring opinion in Tennessean Newspapers, Inc.
v. FHA. 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 51

separate opinion in the Hawhes case is a helpful catalyst to this
process.
Judge Miller's remarks, while stating the general rule that
the court cannot be deprived of its equitable powers by mere
statutory enactment, appear to recognize some limitation on
these powers. Judge Miller qualifies his objections by saying that
it is "unnecessary to decide whether a court may not in some
situations under the Freedom of Information Act apply general
equitable principles.' ' His is not a categorical rejection of any
encroachment whatsoever on the court's equity powers, but a
rejection of general abdication of such powers. Even though
Judge Miller does not accept the majority's view that the Act's
legislative history controls its application such that the court
becomes bound to implement the Act in place of exercising its
own equitable powers, he appears to concur in all other aspects
of the majority opinion. And in so doing Judge Miller impliedly
accepts the Act as preempting the court's discretion at least to
the extent that equitable principles do not become applicable
unless the court first determines that none of the nine exemptions
apply. This reasoning necessarily implies that the Act requires
court review of an agency's action in withholding information,
and possible application of any of the Act's statutory exemptions,
prior to applying general equitable principles and imposing a
nonstatutory remedy. Such a modified approach would not preclude the trying of a suit altogether, as would, for example, the
principle that where an adequate remedy at law exists equitable
relief is not available.' The necessity of following this sequence
creates a condition precedent to the exercise of a court's traditional equitable discretion, thereby placing some limit on its
equity jurisdiction.
:11467 F.2d at 797 (emphasis added).
"Concerning available remedies for withholding disclosable information, it is interesting to note the contradiction between the Department of Justice's endorsement of a court's
inherent equitable powers in administering the Act and the statement of Mr. Robert
Ackerly, another attorney engaged in litigation under the FOIA, who was called to testify
before the 1972 House Subcommittee on Government Operations. Discussing the possibility of speeding up agency action by asking the court to enjoin renegotiation proceedings
until the agency complies with the Act, he stated: "The Department of Justice denies that
the court has any jurisdiction whatsoever to enter an injunction outside the injunction
mentioned in the Act." Hearings, supra note 16, at 1401. Accepting Mr. Ackerly's statement as accurate, the position of the Justice Department, that a court has inherent power
to exercise equitable discretion, but that this does not extend to shaping equitable remedies, is untenable.
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On the other hand, the view of the majority in Hawkes, and
of the other circuits holding the same way, appears to leave itself
open for the exercise of equitable discretion if the need should
arise. It is significant that the Hawkes majority declined to hold
as a rule of law that in general the Act precludes exercise of a
court's equity powers. Similarly, Soucie v. David,4 often cited for
holding that the Act precludes a court's equity powers, also leaves
itself leeway for applying equity rules in extreme circumstances.4 2
These cases which uphold the Act's displacement of the court's
equity jurisdiction, seem to imply that in extreme circumstances,
if none of the Act's exemptions apply so as to withhold disclosure,
the court retains such equitable powers as are necessary to do
justice outside the Act's language.
A basis for resolution of these seemingly antagonistic points
of departure exists in the recognition that, although certain of a
court's traditional powers have been limited and that certain
equitable principles have been made inapplicable under the
Act,4 situations may arise which could lead the court to apply
equitable principles." The resolution of the equitable discretion
question, then, would not necessarily involve a substantial shift
from present policy and practice, but would lie in the courts'
incorporation of both of the positions that have been developing.
This compromise, if adopted by the courts, would make for an
adaptable, flexible, and realistic application of the FOIA.
'448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
'-The Soucie court stated:
Since judicial use of traditional equitable principles to prevent disclosure would upset this legislative resolution of conflicting interests, we are
persuaded that Congress did not intend to confer on district courts a general
power to deny relief on equitable grounds apart from the exemptions in the
Act itself. There may be exceptional circumstances in which a court could
fairly conclude that Congress intended to leave room for the operation of
limited judicial discretion, but no such circumstance appears in the present
record of this case.
Id. at 1077 (footnote omitted).
"E.g., the principle that equity is not available where an adequate remedy at law
exists should not be applied under the Information Act since this would focus on the seeker
rather than the material sought. It is true that this principle was also rejected in Hawkes
because of the change of circumstance such that substantial justice would have been
denied had the court applied it. But the majority intimated that the district court was
not justified in apparently accepting the IRS' argument that this principle applied.
Also, certain equitable principles which would bar an action altogether are made
inapplicable because the court must first apply the Act to find if any exemptions apply
before considering any equitable principles.
"See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
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Incorporation of both views, however, would necessarily impose equity jurisdiction (at least in extreme circumstances, with
the definition and application of what is "extreme" left up to the
courts) on courts such as the Hawkes majority which do not want
equity jurisdiction under the Act. Moreover, such a two-step resolution, in which the Act is first construed to find out if any exemption applies, and then if none applies the courts are allowed
to invoke equity jurisdiction, could result in a one-sided construction in favor of nondisclosure, in effect giving the government two
chances in which to defy what appears on the Act's face to be a
clear mandate to disclose. Such a result flies in the face of the
Act's purpose, and yet appears justified somewhat by the ambivalence inherent in its language and history.
CONCLUSION

Realistically, however, the circuit courts appear unlikely to
resolve the equitable discretion question on their own, since five
circuits have already reached conflicting positions on the issue.
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits have upheld courts' equitable discretion in applying the FOIA, and the Fourth, Sixth, and District
of Columbia Circuits have decided that courts do not have such
discretion under the Act.", Although the Supreme Court could
decide this issue, it has not yet done so. Therefore, the solution
to the equitable discretion question will more likely be forthcoming, if at all, from Congress.
Phyllis L Crist
"Note, supra note 34.

